ASYMMETRICAL METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE

Abstract. The task of the article to show how methodology produces the image of society. Reductionism presents the abstract picture of society and its structures. Antireductionism describes social being as process. Understanding of asymmetrical relation two methods gives us the knowledge trends the modern social-humanitarian knowledge.

Key words: philosophy and abstract notion of society, reductionism and presentation big systems of society, antireductionism and process being of human individuals, postclassical paradigm and evolution of social-humanitarian knowledge.

Illusion of symmetry
Two stereotypes operate in a usual practice of socially-humanitarian researches.
The First allows each discipline to choose and use the method.
The Second assumes, that derivation from particulars of life of people is originally made, greater structures are defined, then there is an abstraction of a society as a Big system. This design is projected on concrete problems and the description of life of people. By way of methodology it is a pyramid in which are interfaced reductionism and antireductionism. Natural activity reduces individual, private, especial to subsystems and system of a society, and then it suggests to describe behaviour of people within the limits of these systems. There is an illusion some kind of symmetry. Individual life of people is reduced to the generalized social forms, then these forms serve as the tool of the description and an explanation of life of people. But this illusion collides with practice of socially-humanitarian researches. And this practice submits to rules of a division of labour and varies during social changes and shifts in methodology of knowledge of a society.

Reductionism as a norm
In the process of becoming of scientific social knowledge reductionism has played the main methodological role. But it was not the philosophical reductionism that was reducing the reality to philosophical abstractions, but the reductionism brought up by natural science and its standards of scientific, objective and commonly significant investigation[1]. Separation itself of “scientific” from “non-scientific” in social sciences used to happen primarily under influence of the norms and standards of natural sciences, in particular - theoretic mechanics.[2]. The thesis about reducing human interconnections to “logic of things” is accepted as the most significant methodological principle and has been acting for almost a century.

No doubt, reductionism can be treated as the universal methodology of human activity, reducing complex to simple, hidden to apparent, unmeasured to counted. However in the plane of becoming and developing scientific social knowledge reductionism plays a special role. It should be stressed this special role changes quite fast, sometimes not apparently to the participants of this history themselves.
The first reductionism works as an instrument of reducing various to equal in human activity, individual to common in human interactions, and specific to general in defining social forms. So the representations about classes and groups of people, about the branches and spheres of their activity, about structures of social reproduction arouse. In this way the details from which the picture of social life was composed, were formed; the model of society in which these “parts” exist in definite relation and subordination, was presented. The fact that this picture is violent and approximate is not important in the beginning. It is significant that the prospect of scientific investigation of society and scientifically provided effect on it is opened up.

Classics-founders of social science sacrificed certain qualities of being for creating social science itself, for the possibility to construct within it appropriate theories and to use them. In the prospect concretization of these theories and their approximation to realities of people’s being were supposed. In fact, the state of things in social sciences occurred so that the schemes were founded on reductionism often played the roles of ready-made theories as instruments design and practical action.

The conception of society which exists over people and the methodology of reductionism turned out to be closely connected; society alienates from individuals (both in theoretic and practical sense) because its structures reduce deindividualized forces of people into its reproduction, leaving outside sociality their differences, features and self-actualization. This is how dual ontology of society is composed: 1) ontology of structures and 2) ontology of people, - hence, various dualisms: structural and agentic, objective and subjective, social and humanitarian.

Anti-reductionism as an anticlassical reaction
The significant factor, that made the methodological role of reductionism doubtful, was the shift of advanced domains of natural science to non-classical path. “Turnings around” of social science to
classical natural sciences played a bad joke. While the social science tried to make the investigation of people similar to the investigations of things in classical mechanics, natural science started investigating non-classical object (waves, fields and particles) that are not things. The logic of things was losing its gnoseological and ontological bases; a thing stopped being axiom of investigation and interaction of things – its elementary cell or frame of reference. Reducing joint and individual life of people to logic of things lost its previous scientific attraction.

Somehow, the problem of alternative methodology arose in social sciences. At the beginning of XX century this tendency became bold as marginal movement of social knowledge: social sciences got shadow satellites; in each of them – sociology, psychology, history - there appeared features of work of shadow schools.

In more general plan reductionism there is an element of a scientific paradigm of social science. It correlates with representation of a society as the Big system, and the system is treated as structure to which norms, standards and human individuals adapt.

In philosophy there were the schools showing impossibility of consideration of a society, history, culture, being life of people from positions of reductionism [Dyltay, Rikert]. There was a question on division of knowledge of a society on two kinds, using different methodology.

Dyltay has opposed reductionism with a method of understanding.

G.Rikert has gone further, having shown, that the method of reductionism makes representation about the nature, and the method of antireductionism, produced understanding individuality of the phenomena, builds a picture of culture, history, individual life of people .

Turn is shown. Not the subject defines a method, and the method forms our representation about culture, a society and a persons.

Strangely enough, it corresponded to tendencies of natural sciences of the twentieth century, describes a receptions of representation of object, on dependence of an image of object on means of its revealing and representation.

Actually this process meant transition to a new paradigm of social sciences [3], [4]. By way of methodology it led to refusal of unity of knowledge, hence from a method reductionism as leading principle.

There has come an era of methodological pluralism, an era of revision of concepts of social system as structures and from reductionism as dominant method of representation of life of people [5].

The crisis of structural sociality was expressed in a number of conceptions declaring the end of philosophy, science, culture, history, subject, man, sociality. Their destructive pathos, moreover, was a reaction to treating social structures as superindividual, quasinatural, quasimechanical. Destruction of sociality in this context was represented primarily as decay or dismantling of big quassubstantial structures, dividing and connecting individuals, absorbing their energy, adopting (socializing) them to their functions .

Dismantling of theories and methodologies that reach only reduction of individuals’ being to big structures, corresponded to the trends of social practice.

Thus, social theory and methodology guess the dynamics of structures of sociality, their individual measurement [6], [7]. Dynamics of social life and diversity of social change of the last two decade of XX century obviously exceeded theoretical methodologies of knowledge about sociality. It could reflect separate aspects of social historical dynamics but was not able to embrace the current process by connected theoretical models, to correlate global, local and individual dynamics of sociality.

The philosophical ”subject - subject” scheme was supported by linguistic, psychological, phenomenological models of communications designed first of all for the description of direct human interactions. However social problems of the end of the XX and the begining of the XXI centuries are specifying the tasks - including the tasks of global character - to overcome the limits of this circle. The question about indirect human interactions, about social things and about proper methodology is becoming more & more important.

**Anti-reductionism as a post-classical trend**

Further it says about antireductionism not as nihilistic and antireductionist reaction to classical science, but as a methodological strategy that provides understanding the dynamics of society, its connection with self-being of the individuals and with understanding human differences as resources of qualitative renewing of social forms

Thus, the methodology of post-classical antireductionism becomes the methodology of social beings’ dynamics. This dynamics concretizes in tasks conservation of social reproduction, design and constructing of being’s connections, and development of social interactions [8]. The latter is clearly associated with the questions of identifying the peculiarities, differences and individual structures of subjects creating the situation on interaction. Hence, the problem of becoming, conservation and changing of social form as a form of concrete subjects’ interaction arises. In this point arises the perspective on considering subject and individual dimension of social projects, models and constructs that become forms of social interactions. In general methodological aspect it is actually problematization, operationalization, instrumentalization of system of coordinates that were offered by Einstein. In the social-ontological aspect it is problematization, dynamization, personalization of social forms, deducing them from the context of polysubjective sociality.

In the gnoseological aspect antireductionism is oriented on revealing the specific nature of objects and their special logic, and in this sense, their self-being. The unknown becomes well-known, not by reducing it to pre-formulated classifications and typisation, but via revealing the specific, inherent to it, mode of being. One of the key features of antireductionism is a set to form an object’s conception in the process of interaction with it and in the process of knowing it. The
conception of the object may be quite rational but it starts from the moment of defining the differences of the object from the others and expands as description of specific logic of its being. The idea of difference is forming as initial condition of interaction and knowledge, it works in the contact with the specific object, it determines the targets of knowledge and it has, no doubt, value significance.

Within the limits of traditional philosophy reductionism and antireductionism are different methodological procedures. From the point of view of socially-historical they represent different types social knowledge and different stages of evolution of a society. It is possible to tell, they carry out different paradigmal functions in different types of social-humanitarian knowledge. It is enough to notice, that reductionism was defining in becoming social sciences in the middle of the nineteenth century. Antireductionism has predetermined division of social sciences and humanitarian knowledge into a boundary of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Constructivistical trend of social knowledge in the second half twentieth centuries deduces on leading positions methodology of antireductionism Accordingly, division of social and humanitarian knowledge loses former sense [9].

Decomposition of socially-humanitarian disciplines interferes with understanding of the general tendencies of knowledge of a society[10 ]. One of methods of overcoming of this situation is the historical-methodological approach. But it is business of special researches [11]. [12].

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE MARKET PARADIGM

Summary. The purpose of the work is to analyze and evaluate the socio-ethical, worldview and epistemological consequences of the commercialization of scientific activity in modern conditions. The author dwells on the works of P. Weingart, J.-F. Lyotard, D. Nelkin, J. Ravetz and other experts in this area of research. The implications of increasing the dependence of researchers on funding subjects are outlined. As a result, such negative phenomena for science and society as the concealment of methods and the production of incomplete ("under-received") knowledge arise. Separately, the article deals with the issue of the emergence and dissemination of so-called entrepreneurial science. One of the main and undoubtedly consequences of the progressive commercialization of research activities, according to the author, should be considered the process of destruction of science-relevant system of assessments and motivational attitudes.

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