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Peliukh O.S.,

PhD in Law, doctoral student

National Academy of the Security Service of Ukraine

Artiukhova N.O.,

PhD in Law, doctoral student

National Academy of the Security Service of Ukraine

DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE METHODS USED BY THE STATE SECURITY BODIES ON THE TERRITORY OF UKRAINE: RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS

Abstract. In the paper, the retrospective analysis of counterintelligence methods' application is carried out. It is found that the methods of intelligence and counterintelligence activity have been used since the formation of separate Kyivan Rus principalities on the territory of Ukraine. It is suggested that counterintelligence, as well as its methods, has received significant theoretical and scientific substantiation only since the second half of the twentieth century. However the effective application of such methods dates back to the Middle Ages, whereas their classification has remained practically unchanged till nowadays. It is proved that counterintelligence methods and techniques are undergoing constant changes and are in the process of dynamic development caused by the improvement of foreign intelligence services. Based on the results of the research, it is substantiated that the scientific approaches to methods as categories of counterintelligence theory and practice should be reconsidered in the contemporary context.

Key words: *counterintelligence, intelligence, agent method, provocation method, covert examination of mail, covert surveillance, criminal analysis method, operational game, combination.*

Introduction. The most important conditions for safe existence, viability and sustainable development of the state and society are protection of national sovereignty, social security and ensuring effective operation of all the state bodies. In this context, the protection of national interests from real and potential threats, risks and challenges lies within the competence of the intelligence services, whose primary function is counterintelligence. It is well known that the tasks performed by counterintelligence penetrate into almost all spheres of public relations, and their successful fulfillment neutralizes existing threats, ensures the country's prestige and competitiveness on the global arena and strengthens its international positions. Thus, modern counterintelligence is aimed at timely detection, prevention and suppression of the encroachments of foreign special services towards the national interests in vital sectors of social relations, in

particular, economic, political, information, cyber, environmental spheres, etc.

Taking into consideration the above-mentioned, it is extremely urgent to analyze the development of counterintelligence methods from ancient times till nowadays, since modern research studies should take into account both positive and negative historical experience and practical heritage of past generations.

The study of the genesis of counterintelligence methods proves that this theoretical, applied and scientific category appeared at the same time with the introduction of the term "counterintelligence". Moreover, the study of the historical aspect of counterintelligence methods is of great importance for further development of their theoretical, legal and organizational foundations. In our opinion, mastering the experience of the past is determined by the need to develop basic and applied research aimed at improving counterintelligence methods.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The history of development of the state security bodies on the territory of Ukraine was studied by the following domestic scholars: B. Bernadskiy, T. Ostashko, R. Podkur, V. Sidak, D. Vedeneev and others. Theoretical, legal and organizational foundations of the counterintelligence activity were considered by: V. Krutov, O. Lebedev, A. Maruschak, Iu. Naidion, A. Pashkova, V. Pypychiuk, I. Ryzhov, M. Strelbytskiy, M. Shilin, O. Iurchenko et al. Various historical aspects of the theory and practice of soviet secret services attracted the attention of such foreign researchers as: O. Kryshchanovskaya, C. McMahon, B. O'Connor, A. Sever, S. White and others.

However, the analysis of the research papers on the theory and practice of national security suggests that considerable attention is paid by historians to the origin of counterintelligence methods. At the same time, scholars in the field of state security have not studied the process of counterintelligence methods development thoroughly enough. Therefore, there is a need in a special study on the mentioned issue.

The goal of the paper is to analyze the historical retrospective of counterintelligence methods, as a process of origin, formation, development and improvement of methods of detection and prevention of intelligence, terrorist and other illegal activities of foreign special services. To achieve this goal, the authors used the historical research method, which made it possible to analyze the circumstances of counterintelligence methods emergence, features of their development at each stage of Ukrainian state formation, as well as the process of their improvement. The use of the system method made it possible to understand the evolution of counterintelligence methods as a complete systemic process in all its diversity of internal and external relations, structural elements and levels.

Presentation of the basic material. Ukrainian counterintelligence has undergone a long and complex path of evolution. Counterintelligence, as well as its methods, begins its history from the time of the first independent principalities of Kyivan Rus. In those days, covert activities including both intelligence and counterintelligence were closely linked to military intelligence and directly to military action. For this reason, the methods of these activities used to have much in common.

On the other hand, the counterintelligence support of state interests by the authorized bodies had taken various forms and methods, which were constantly changing. The mental perception of what society considered a threat to state security had changed as well. Since the definition of periods in the development of state and law is determined by the criteria that justify periodization, the priority should be given to those that reflect the qualitative modification of the state legislative system [1, p. 36-37].

Counterintelligence has come a long way to become professionally-oriented. As to the Middle Ages, we cannot speak of true counterintelligence – an organized and goal-oriented structure that operates as regularly and systematically as nowadays. Thus, the fundamental need to counteract foreign intelligence has

arisen due to the formation of various structural units of their special services. That is why, the term "counterintelligence" in relation to the times of Kyivan Rus and the era of Ukrainian Cossacks is rather relevant.

However, already in 1190 one of the Kyiv chroniclers had noted that Kyivan Rus commanders adopted from the Polovtsian khans the method of "head acquisition" before or during the military campaign, which may indicate the actual birth of the agent method of special services (or their analogs at that time). In our opinion, the "head acquisition" could have given rise to the methods and techniques of information extraction concerning the preparedness of the hostile army, its number, weapons and plans for attack or defense. Moreover, the chroniclers of that time mentioned the use of methods of information collection in the process of continuous fight between the princes and their vaivodes (army commanders) during the period of disunity of the Old Russian state in the XII century [2, p. 50-55].

At the time of the Ukrainian Cossacks, when Ukrainian lands were divided by conflicting states, the Ukrainian people, in order to protect their lives and social development, had to look for the methods of active military counteraction and develop various methods of self-defense. Agent penetration into different social groups and classes, nationalities and religions became very popular at that time. The recruiting of foreign agents could also be observed.

During the reign of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, an agent network in Warsaw and the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was created. It provided the necessary political and military information in a timely manner. Using the counterintelligence service, B. Khmelnytsky initiated the spread of disinformation to develop self-doubt and mood of panic in the hostile army. In his proclamations and instructions addressed to the population, the hetman insisted on the need to create feeling of hopelessness, tension and uncertainty in the enemy. Therefore, this was for the first time in the domestic operational art when disinformation was used to exercise beneficial psychological influence on the enemy. Such methods were used during the battles near Korsun, Pylyavtsi and Berestechko. Quite often the necessary information was extracted from the captured prisoners. It should be noted that the Cossack art of capturing prisoners was considered one of the best in Europe at that time [3].

The counterintelligence (at that time defined as counter-espionage activity) was first mentioned during the reign of Peter the First. Thus, at the very beginning of the eighteenth century the mentioned state function was entrusted to the Quartermaster-General army department. In the future, with the development of the system of political investigation bodies, this duty was more often placed on such units by the tsarist government. The efficiency of the political police and gendarmerie, the so-called Third Section, had significantly increased under the leadership of A.H. Benkendorf. At that time, these units paid great attention to the control over the youth political organizations, educational institutions were taken under

special supervision, the control over the guard officers was strict as well.

The government of Nicholas the First sought to quickly cease the activities of any secret societies and meetings, various oppositionists. Following the Polish rebellion of 1830-1831, the Third Section and the Gendarmerie Corps were assigned the function of monitoring Polish immigrants who lived densely in the interior provinces, and, in fact, the counterintelligence functions were also assigned to it. Almost all foreigners arriving on the territory of the empire were under covert control. Moreover, A.H. Benkendorf always personally participated in the most significant political processes and was the keynote speaker for the emperor. Being the head of the Third Section, A.H. Benkendorf was quite active in introducing such counterintelligence methods as: agent, combination, intelligent surveillance, covert examination, etc.

In particular, in one of his reports to Nicholas the First A.H. Benkendorf emphasized the extremely high efficiency of the covert examination of mail [4]. According to him: "Perlustration is one of the most important means of discovering the truth, allowing to stop evil at the very beginning; it also serves as an indicator of the public opinion and way of thinking about contemporary events and various governmental measures and regulations". This method helped to discover rebels' links, find their location and define their role in the party organization [5].

A good example of the use of undercover sources at that time was the introduction of A.H. Benkendorf's sister, princess D.H. Lieven as an agent to establish and develop contact with the Austrian Chancellor Clement von Metternich. And she succeeded with this task. It was a distance relationship, that still implied the effective use of information extraction techniques. Their correspondence lasted for almost 10 years, and contained information concerning the Chancellor's political views on the situation in Europe, relations with Russia, which at that time possessed the territories of the present-day Ukraine. The Princess's letters were delivered by A.H. Benkendorf to the Russian emperor. Moreover, the princess used to write the most important messages to Russia with special invisible ink, which proves the use of special and advanced counterintelligence means and methods at that time. Formal reason to stop this correspondence and to divert suspicion from the agent became a new marriage of the Chancellor [6].

At the same time, together with the positive experience in the use of counterintelligence methods, the counter-espionage activity was considered by the staff of the Third Section as a function not appropriate for these units, due to ineffectiveness in counteracting foreign subversive activities using the existing methods. Therefore, at the beginning of the 20th century, when the foreign subversive activity had significantly increased and started to be carried out professionally, the Third Section appeared to be unprepared for effective counteraction of the foreign intelligence. The biggest problem was the ineffectiveness of the so-called "provocation" method, which consisted in encouraging individuals to commit unlawful acts. Such method was quite actively used before against the political opponents, however it was not effective at all in terms of counter-espionage. The

use of the "provocation" method involved the infiltration of mostly undercover agents into the underground political groups and organizations, which in most cases led to their early disclosure. At the same time, many politicians and statesmen of that time described the complex of methods and techniques used within the "provocation" method as "morally unacceptable".

Taking into account the above-mentioned, it is necessary to distinguish between the provocation method, which is forbidden today by the legal acts and is not used by the national special service, and a combination that does not encourage a person to commit crime, and instead in its essence and content implies the exertion of a hidden beneficial influence. It should be noted that at that time, the combination was used mostly to create the conditions for the infiltration of the covert sources into foreign intelligence services. The limited use of the combination in practice and giving the advantage to provocation did not make it possible to obtain the maximum effect from these methods.

One of the methods that started to be professionally used by the tsarist secret police was the covert surveillance method. The covert surveillance agent network emerged after the secret police departments were founded. Moreover, in 1902, a special "Instruction on Covert Surveillance" was adopted and approved by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior, P. Stolypin, which proves the development of the legal basis for counterintelligence activity and its methods at that time [5].

In addition, covert surveillance agents (the so-called "field surveillance") were required to have the skills of identifying persons by distinguishing features, being familiar with the terrain, using the ways and techniques of distinguishing peculiarities of persons under surveillance, being familiar with the organization of revolutionary parties, methods of conspiracy and covert surveillance in different settings [5].

Among the reasons for the creation of counterintelligence departments in 1911 were the new threats that appeared at that time and the ineffectiveness of the methods of the gendarmerie in the fight against espionage. The first counterintelligence body in the non-military period began to operate on the basis of the "Regulations on counterintelligence offices". At the same time, the Instruction for the Chief of counterintelligence department was approved. These legal acts actually constituted the legal basis of counterintelligence activities at that time. In terms of the Regulations, 10 counterintelligence departments were created, two of them performed their activities on the territory of modern Ukraine, in particular, in the Headquarters of Kyiv and Odessa military districts [7].

Thus, one of the leaders of the above mentioned department argued that in the fight against espionage the personnel should be used in a fundamentally different way than in terms of the political search. In particular, in case of political investigation, the personnel had to directly penetrate into the underground organizations and take an active part in their activities, but such agents could not be used for counteracting foreign subversive activities. Thus, the very nature of counter-espionage activity, which in its turn depended on the forms and

methods of foreign subversive activity, had determined the need to develop special counterintelligence methods.

Being conscious of an urgent need in the effective system of methods for detecting and preventing foreign intelligence activities, the counterintelligence units on the territory of Ukraine at that time made the first steps to develop theoretical and applied support for their activity. In particular, for the first time an attempt was made to theoretically substantiate the counterintelligence methods.

According to the performance analysis of the counterintelligence units, in the first years, it was considered necessary to change the methods of their work from passive surveillance of "suspicious" persons to active offensive counterintelligence methods, in particular, the infiltration of agents into foreign intelligence centers, disinformation and operational games. Success in this case depended on the right choice of staff by the counterintelligence executives, which, as it turned out, was extremely difficult to make [8, paragraph 2.2.].

Moreover, the operational staff was also faced with the same problems when engaging people to cooperate confidentially, since such cooperation was based mostly on a pragmatic approach that had nothing to do with patriotism [8, paragraph 2.2.]. Thus, the counterintelligence officers sought to build confidential relationships with people on the basis of their particular addiction, taking into account only negative features of the person.

The next stage of counterintelligence methods' development that deserves to be mentioned is the period of the Ukrainian state under the reign of Pavlo Skoropadsky, which proved to be the most productive time in the development of the intelligence service and methods of its activity. At the time of the Central Rada, the internal security bodies acted rather inefficiently. On May 18, 1918, at the order of hetman, the National Guard was formed through the reorganization of gendarmerie at the Ministry of Internal Affairs [9, p. 284-292]. The function of domestic counterintelligence was also performed by the Intelligence Division, which had almost unlimited powers, was subordinate directly to the hetman, and the National Guard had to follow its orders. These units were obliged to control the political situation in their area, monitor the activities of local political organizations and movements, recruit and work with the secret agents, organize outdoor and internal surveillance, make arrests and searches at the places where persons suspected of committing state crimes lived/worked, etc. Therefore, at that time the agent method, operational surveillance, operational examination, penetration into dwelling or other premises, etc were used. [9, p. 284-292].

Particular attention should be also focused on an innovative (at that time) method in the field of state interests' protection, namely, the criminal analysis method, which nowadays is a basic method of information evaluation [10, p. 233]. This method was first used by London police detectives at the end of the 19th century and appeared to be quite effective in combating crime. At that time it was adopted in order to increase the efficiency of the police units, and today it is the most widespread theory-based method of law-enforcement activity. At the same time, almost all its

elements (analysis, synthesis, comparison, induction, deduction, abstraction, concretization, generalization, and modeling) are also used in counterintelligence. Thus, in the process of identifying signs of foreign intelligence, terrorist and other unlawful activity, it is important to evaluate the obtained information, that is to establish its value for the national security matters.

The next important stage in the development of counterintelligence methods had the greatest impact on their systematization, as well as on the development of the counterintelligence theory as a whole. Thus, the period of Soviet counterintelligence units should be considered as a dialectically single process, due to the peculiar features of the development of a system of state security bodies.

In December 1917, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission at the Council of People's Commissars (hereinafter referred to as the Cheka) was founded and over time, its local units including those on the present territory of our state, were created. Since the very beginning, its units were given really extraordinary but temporary powers, first and foremost, due to the complex situation of that time. However, systematic steps aimed at improving the application of counterintelligence methods seemed hardly possible under such conditions.

Eventually, foreign intelligence agencies, recognizing the unpromising prospects of active subversive activities, had changed their tactics, and started to pay more attention to covert intelligence operations. Therefore, the counterintelligence units were forced to actively change their methods of counteracting such activities, and that is how the new stage of their development began.

Thus, the analysis of the paper "Operational games as a method of controlled influence: historical aspect" by M.O. Tkachenko suggests that an operative game as a counterintelligence method was actively used at that time with its origins date back to the beginning of the XX century. Herein of particular attention is the Joint State Political Directorate at the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and its operations "Trust" and "Syndicate-2", which improved the tactics of operational games [11, p. 139].

We subscribe to M.O. Tkachenko's view that at that time operative game was actively used as the main component of counterintelligence operations. Whereas, within the framework of the operative game a wide range of influence methods was applied: informational (through covert positions created by agent penetration), situational (creating certain situations that led to making favorable decisions), psychological and emotional (creating or intensifying the object's motivation to take certain actions (decision making)), etc. The successful implementation of these operative games also proved their operational versatility with respect to the tasks it could solve, i.e. the possibility of using this method, both in the process of detecting and preventing subversive activities [11, p. 141]. Other methods (agent, combination, disinformation) are also actively used together with this method. Especially it concerned disinformation, which had no longer been a one-off event and assumed a long-term disinformation influence creating such conditions for spreading and perceiving false information, which significantly contributed to

making the necessary decision by the opponent [11, p. 143].

Thus, the analysis of the previous studies shows that the efforts to create a theoretical basis for counterintelligence, including methods of such activity, were made in the mid 1960's. However, it should be noted that all the counterintelligence methods mentioned in this paper have been developed, improved and effectively used in counterintelligence practice, but have not yet received a scientifically grounded theoretical basis and systematization.

In the late 1960's, the attempts were made to systematize counterintelligence methods. Thus, the means and techniques of counterintelligence methods,

tools and mechanisms that can be used in the process of their application, as well as their concepts, are being theoretically substantiated.

In the 1970's and 1980's, the counterintelligence methods were systematized and specific definitions of their concepts were elaborated. Their further development took place only during the formation of the Security Service of Ukraine, however without any significant changes till the present day.

Therefore, taking into account the historical course of events and their influence on the operation of state security bodies, we suggest to define the following stages of counterintelligence methods' development (Table 1):

Table 1

EVOLUTION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE METHODS

#	Period	Method	Responsible unit/department	Application
1.	Kyivan Rus (882-1240) and the period of its disunity	"Head acquisition", agent reports, information collection from the military advance guard, etc.	Princes and their vaivodes (army commanders)	Collecting information on the preparedness of the hostile army, its number, weapons and plans for attack or defense.
2.	The time of the Ukrainian Cossacks (XV – XVIII century)	Agent penetration; recruiting of foreign agents; creation of agent networks; spread of disinformation; information extraction.	Cossack military divisions	Active military counteraction and developing various methods of self-defense. Getting necessary political and military information. Developing self-doubt and mood of panic in the hostile army.
3.	Reign of Peter the First (1672-1725)	Counter-espionage activity	Quartermaster-General army department, political police and gendarmerie	Control over the youth political organizations, educational institutions, guard officers.
4.	Government of Nicholas the First (1825—1855) and tsarist secret police (1866-1917)	Agent penetration, combination, intelligent surveillance, covert examination perustration, use of undercover sources, provocation method.	The Third Section and the Gendarmerie Corps	Interrupting activity of any underground organizations and meetings, oppositionists. Covert control over the foreigners. Identifying persons by distinguishing features, covert surveillance in different settings.
5.	Central Rada (March 1917-April 1918)	Infiltration of agents into foreign intelligence centers, disinformation, operational games, agent recruiting	Counterintelligence units	Penetration into the underground organizations, taking an active part in their activities; building confidential relationships with people on the basis of their particular addiction.
6.	Ukrainian state under the reign of Pavlo Skoropadsky (April–December 1918)	Agent method, operational surveillance, operational examination, penetration into dwelling or other premises, criminal analysis method, etc.	National Guard, Intelligence Division	Monitoring political situation and activities of local political organizations and movements, recruiting and working with the secret agents, organizing outdoor and internal surveillance, making searches and arrests.

7.	1917-1990	Operational games, agent infiltration, combination, disinformation, interrogation, experiment, examination, surveillance, information collection and evaluation.	Cheka; Joint State Political Directorate; KGB	Counteracting foreign subversive activities; exercising informational, situational, psychological and emotional influence on the opponents.
8.	1991 – till the present day	All the above-mentioned counterintelligence methods	Security Service of Ukraine	The process of reconsidering scientific approaches to methods as categories of counterintelligence theory and practice takes place.

It should also be mentioned that the vast majority of counterintelligence methods analyzed in this paper have proved their efficiency not only in historical retrospective but also have been quite actively used by the state security bodies of Ukraine. At the same time, due to the technological development, various techniques of the counterintelligence methods' application have changed while others remain the same as many thousand years ago.

Thus, the methods of covert mail examination are less applied in practice due to the growing popularity of various messengers and e-mails, including those for the secret communication between special services and their agents, which forced the security bodies to look for technical capabilities to control such kinds of information exchange. The above-mentioned indicates that counterintelligence bodies have to use the latest progressive means to counteract subversive activities of foreign special services, which directly influences the improvement of their own counterintelligence methods and techniques.

Conclusions. The retrospective analysis of counterintelligence methods proves that as a phenomenon of intelligence and, subsequently, counterintelligence activity, its special methods have been used in one or another way since the ancient times and have come a long way of development. Thus, already during the period of Kyivan Rus special services (or their analogs) have used such methods as: agent, disinformation, combination, operational game, covert surveillance, operational examination, methods of information evaluation, etc. However, theoretically substantiated and systematized the counterintelligence methods were only in the second half of the twentieth century, which significantly contributed to their further development.

Current complex geopolitical situation in the world requires reconsidering of scientific approaches to methods as categories of counterintelligence theory and practice. Moreover, the revision of the content and essence of the existing methods and creation of new ones is needed.

This retrospective analysis of counterintelligence methods' development, in our opinion, can be used for

further thorough research aimed at improving the theoretical foundations of counterintelligence activities of the state security bodies of Ukraine.

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